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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Mr. Justice White also wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined.6 7 He disagreed with the majority's finding that no waiver was proved.6 8 He pointed out that
before the trip defendant was given the Miranda warnings by two
sets of police officers, two attorneys, and a judge.69 The statement
made by the police officer was not coercive; it was accompanied
by a request that defendant not respond to it, and it was made hours
before defendant made the incriminating statements. White reasoned
that the fact that defendant consulted with counsel on the question of
whether to talk to the police in counsel's absence made hi's later
decision to talk better informed and more intelligent.7 0 He stated
that "[w]aiver is shown whenever the facts establish that an accused knew of a right and intended to relinquish it. Such waiver,
'' 1
even if not express, was plainly shown here.
The .Williams decision indicates the Court will continue to give
Miranda a limited effect until an alternative to the safeguards' of
that decision is devised.7 2 In light of recent Supreme Court decisions
which have undermined Miranda and the wide-spread public criticism of Miranda,7' 3 however, it appears likely that Miranda will be
overruled. The traditional tests of trustworthiness and voluntariness
will undoubtedly replace Miranda's prophylactic rules, as advocated
by Mr. Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion.7 4
JIM STEWART

FEDERAL COURTS-FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-PLAINTIFF ALLOWED TO
ASSERT CLAIM DIRECTLY AGAINST NON-DIVERSE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

Plaintiff, an Iowa citizen, brought a diversity action1 against
67.
id.

Id. at 1255. Mr. Justice Blackmun disagreed that the case fit the mold of Massiah,
at 1259, and that the statements made by Learning were "tantamount to interroga-

tion." Id. at 1260.
68. Id. at 1257.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1257-58.
71. Id. at 1258.
72. 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1976).
73. Twenty-two States strongly urged the Brewer Court to re-examine and overrule Its
procedural
(as distinguished from constitutional) ruling in Miranda. 97 S.Ct. at 1259.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1252-53. See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 111 (1975)
(White, J., concurring) (M1irajida should be overruled at this time and a voluntariness standard of almissibility substituted in its place)
1.

28.U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) states as follows:
(a)
The district courts shall have original Jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of Interest and costs, and Is between-
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Omaha Public Power District and Paxton and Vierling Steel Company for the wrongful death of her husband, who was electrocuted in
a construction accident. Thereafter, Owen Equipment and Erection
Company was impleaded as a third-party defendant.2 Plaintiff then

amended her complaint to include an action directed toward Owen
which alleged diversity between them.8 When the trial started after
two years of complex pleadings the parties had been reduced to
plaintiff and Owen. 4 On the third day of trial Owen contended that
its principal place of business was in Iowa and challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of lack of diversity.5 The district court rejected this challenge, contending it had discretion to
hear the action despite the lack of diversity.6 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrines of ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction allowed the court to retain its jurisdiction. Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Co.., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
The concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are used to
broaden the jurisdictional base of the federal courts.7 Each, however, has historical'y been applied to accommodate different situations. By the concept of ancillary jurisdiction it is held that a district court obtains jurisdiction of the entire case or controversy before it. Once its jurisdiction is properly invoked the district court
may decide other matters raised by the case, which, if brought independently, would not come under the court's jurisdiction. 8 Ancillary jurisdiction usually arises in the context of a diversity action.'
Pendent jurisdiction, on the other hand, has been traditionally
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3)
citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
2. Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417. 418 (8th Cir. 1977). Fmt,.
R. Crv. P. 14(a) sets out the procedure to be used when a defendant wishes to implead a
thirty party. Rule 14,(a) provides in part as follows:
(a)
When Defendant may Bring in Third Party. At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the
service If he files the third-party complaint not later than 10 days after he
serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon
notice to all Parties to the action....
3. The amended complaint alleged that Owen was "a Nebraska corporation with its
principal Place of business in Nebraska." 558 F.2d at 419.
4. Id. at 418.
5. Id. at 419. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) provides in relevant part as follows: "(')
For the purpose of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business ..
.
6. 558 F.2d at 419.
7. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33
U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 760 (1972).
S. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERA. COURTS § 9 (2d e'l. 1970).
9. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
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applied only in federal question'" cases. It refers only to the joinder
of a state claim with a federal claim. If the federal claim is sufficient to invoke the district court's jurisdiction, the court is also
entitled to hear the pendent state claim.1 '
Ancillary jurisdiction had its beginnings in the early case of
Freeman v. Howe.12 There, certain of defendant's railroad cars had
been attached by Freeman, a United States Marshall, pursuant to a
diversity action ,in federal court. The mortgagees of the railroad then
brought an action of replevin against Freeman in state court and
obtained judgment. On appeal the United States Supreme Court held
that a state court has no authority to interfere with property under
the control of a federal court.' 3 The mortgagees had argued that to
bar their state court action would leave them without a remedy because they lacked diversity and could not bring their claims in federal court. 1 4 The Supreme Court called this argument a misapprehension of the law and stated that the mortgagees would be entitled
to have their claims heard in federal court, notwithstanding the requirement of complete diversity,' 5 because these claims were ancillary to the question properly before the court. 16
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has continued to develop
and expand. The Supreme Court has held that ancillary jurisdiction
extends to a compulsory counterclaim which lacks an independent
7
jurisdictional base even though the main claim has been dismissed.'
Cross-claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (g),'8 implead10. See Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 2S U.S.C.
1331 (1970) is the federal question statute and provides that district courts have original
Jurisdiction over all civil actions If the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
11. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (2d ed. 1970).
12. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
13. Id. at 459.
14. Id. at 460.
15. The doctrine of complete diversity means that all plaintiffs must be of different
citizenship from all defendants. This was established in the case of Strawbridge v. Curtis,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
16. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860). The Court explained this
reasoning as follows:
The principle Is, that a bill filed on the equity aide of the court to restrain or
regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and' thereby prevent
Injustice, or an inequitable advantage under mesne or final process, is not
an original suit, but ancillary and dependant, supp!ementary merely to the
original suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference
to the citizenshin or residence of the partIes.
17. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926). FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)
defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows:
(a)
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against aay
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurence that is the
subject matter of the opposing Party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire JurIsdiction. ...
18. Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957). Cross-claims are governed by
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) which reads as follows:
(g)
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arlsina out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a

317

RECENT CASES

er actions under Rule 14 (a),'19 and intervention as of right under
Rule 24 (a) 20 have all been held to be ancillary. A claim brought by
a third-party defendant against the plaintiff 21 has also been held to
be ancillary.
Ancillary jurisdiction is applied in cases where jurisdiction is extended to additional parties. On the other hand, pendent jurisdiction
has traditionally been limited to federal question cases involving
just one plaintiff and one defendant where there are additional claims
22
involved.
In 1824, in Osborn v. Bank of United States,'23 the Supreme
Court stated as follows:
[Wihere a question to which the judicial power of the union
is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.24
Almost a century later, in Hum v. Oursier,25 the Court held that
federal courts could retain jurisdiction over the whole action if there
were two separate grounds in support of a single cause of action
and one of them presented a federal question. 26 To this the Court
contrasted the situation in which two separate and distinct causes
of action are alleged, only one of which involves a federal question.
Retention of the non-federal cause of action under the guise of penT
dent jurisdiction would be impermissible in that situation.'
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of
the original

action.

Such

cross-clam

may

inc"Ude a

claim

that

the

party

against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all
or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
19. Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 201 F.2d
FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a) defines impleader actions. See supra note 2.

408

(8th Cir.

1953).

20. Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1963). Intervention as
of right Is provided for in FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) which reads as follows:
(a)
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States con-

fers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an
Interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the
21.

applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).

The Revere court's assertion of jurisdiction over the third-party defendant's claim against
the non-diverse plaintiff is the converse of the situation in Kroger and was based on an
analogy to the Rule 14(a) counterclaims, Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaims, and Rule
24 (a) Intervention of right, which have all been held as ancillary. Id. at 715.
22. See generally Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendant
Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 759 (1972) ; Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction- Towards
a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263 (1975).
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
24. Id at 823.
25. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
26. Id. at 246.
27. Id. The Court held that a cause of action did not consist of facts but was a vlolation of a right shown by the facts. Under this analysis the CouI-t in Hum held that n

claim

of Infringement

and one of unfair competition were merely different grounds as-
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The Court has since rejected the Hurn v. OursIer test as "unnecessarily grudging," noting that it had been formulated before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 8 The Court

in

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs29 reasoned that the meaning of the
term "cause of action" had been considerably broadened by the adoption of the Federal Rules. 30 The Court formulated a new two step
approach to the determination of pendency. The federal court must
determine first whether it 'has the power to hear the state claim. 3'
Then it must decide whether it should, in its discretion, retain jurisdiction.32

The doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are still developing under the two step approach enunciated in Gibbs. Some
commentators have noticed that the doctrines appear to be merging.33 Even the Supreme Court, in the recent case of Aldinger v.
Howard'3 4 felt it unnecessary to try to explain the differences between the doctrines.2 5
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, the court in Kroger v.
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. did not attempt to base its decision
on one of the doctrines exclusive of the other. They merely noted
that the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction have led to
expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas which ordinarily did not
come under the jurisdiction of federal courts. 3 The Kroger court
was concerned with the limits of this expansion.3 7
In affirming the district court's retention of jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant the court
noted that the great majority of cases that have dealt with this question have required that the claim have an independent jurisdictional
base. s3 Nonetheless, the court felt that Gibbs was adequate authority
serted to support one cause of action. Id. at 246-47. This approach did not withstand
analysis under the more liberal rules of procedure which were to come. See infra note 30.
28. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
29. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
30. "Under the Rules, the impulse toward entertaining the broadest possible scope
of action consistent with fairness to the parties; Joinder of claims, parties and remedies
Is strongly encouraged." Id. at 724.
31. To acquire this power the state and federal claims must "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact" and the federal claim must be substantial enough to Invoke
the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 725.
32. The Supreme Court stated that this decision Is made by taking into consideration
the factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. Id. at 726.
93. See Note, Rule 14(a) Ancillary Jurisdiction: Plaintiff's Claim Against Non-Diverse
Third-Party Defendant, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 796 (1976); Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263 (1975).
34. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. The Supreme Court stated that "there is little profit in attempting to decide, for
example, whether there are any 'principaled' diffferences between pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction : or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences." Id. at 13.
36. 558 F.2d at 420.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 422. For an extensive list of the cases favoring the majority view see Fawvor
v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 639 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1411,
1430 (1954).
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for their decision to retain jurisdiction.3 9
The majority view that a plaintiff's complaint against a third

party defendant must have an independent jurisdictional basis was
40
recently ratified by the fifth circuit in Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc.
The court rejected the contention that jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claim asserted against a non-diverse third-party defendant could be
based on the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. 41 They
held that the need for complete diversity was fundamental and
well established 42 and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
could not be construed to expand the jurisdiction of the federal
3
courts.

4

There are four basic reasons usually cited in support of the majority view. 44 The first is that a plaintiff should not be allowed to do
indirectly what he cannot do diTectly.45 The second is that the ma-

jority rule prevents collusion between the plaintiff and defendant in
obtaining jurisdiction.46 Third, supporters of the rule contend that
ancillary jurisdiction applies only in situations where the plaintiff is

seeking no relief against the third-party defendant.4T The last reason
usually given is, that federal dockets are so overcrowded that federal
48
courts should not reach out for state based litigation.

These reasons were not flatly rejected by the eighth circuit in
Kroger. Rather, the court accepted the view that the reasons should
be regarded as factors to be considered when exercising their discre-

tion on the matter of jurisdiction. 49 Once all the parties are before
the court involved in a common controversy the court has the jurisdictional power to dispose of the case. 50
39. 558 F.2d at 424.
40. 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977).
41. Id. at 638.
42. The court noted that the principle of complete diversity was well established both
un der the teachings of Strawbridge and the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). Id.
43. Id. at 639. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves specify that none of
these rules can expand federal court jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 states in part as
follows: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue actions therein ....
44. These reasons are collected in Kenrose Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Fred Whitaker Co., Inc.,
512 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1972).
45. McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960). Since the rule requiring diversity of citizenship would not allow a plaintiff to sue directly a co-citizen it is contended
that the plaintiff should not be allowed to indirectly commence his action against the cocitizen by way of the court's retention of jurisdiction under the court's power of ancillary
Jurisdiction.
46. Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.ILD. 171 (E.D. Pa.
1962). Under this reasoning it is feared that a plaintiff may sue a particular diverse defendant who has agreed with the plaintiff that he will implead the non-diverse thirdparty. In this way the requirements of complete diversity would be avoided.
47. Stemler v. Burke, 34,4 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965). The reasoning here is an assertion
that historically ancillary jurisdiction has been applied only in. situations where the plaintiff was not suing the non-diverse third-party defendant. Therefore, ancillary jurisdiction
should not anplv in a case where the plaintiff is asserting a claim directly against the
non-diverse third-party defendant.
48. Ayoub v. Helm's Exnress, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
49. 558 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 424.
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After thus rejecting the majority position and its rationale the
court analyzed the facts and circumstances of the Kroger case under
the guidelines of Gibbs.1
Under the first step of the Gibbs test52 the court determined that
the district court did have power to hear plaintiff's claim over the
third-party defendant. 3 At the time of Kroger's amended complaint

there was no question but that the court had jurisdiction over Kroger's original claim against the defendant Omaha Public Power District and over the defendant's third-party action against Owen.' 4 The
real question to be decided was whether the court had jurisdiction
over plaintiff's claim against Owen. 5 The court determined that Kroger's claim against Owen arose out of the core of "operative facts"
giving rise to both the original complaint and the third-party action
between defendant and Owen.' 6 The court felt that it would be anomalous to hold that Kroger could proceed against the defendants who
could proceed against Owen who in turn could proceed against Kro7
ger, but that Kroger could not proceed against Owen.'
Having decided that the district court had the power to assert
jurisdiction, the court then turned to the question of whether or not
the district court had abused its discretion in deciding to exercise
its power of jurisdiction. The considerations of "judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to litigants" were noted."' Satisfaction of
the first two requirements were found to need no explanation. 9 The
court therefore focused immediately on the element of fairness.60
Decisive on this point was the fact that Owen, the third-party defendant, had gone through two years of pleading and had never chal51. Id.
at 4,24-25. Although the test in Gibbs was applied to obtain jurisdiction in a
different type of action (plaintiff asserted, both a state claim and a federal claim against
the same defendant) the court held it could be applied to the action brought by Kroger.
There have been other cases in the district courts which have used thd Gibbs test as a means
of retaining jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant.
See Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Morgan v.
Serro Travel Trailer Co., Inc., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D.
Kan. 1975) : CCF Industrial Park, Inc.
v. Hastings Industries, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ; Davis v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265
(W.D. Pa. 1968). For pre-Gibbs cases rejecting the majority view see Olson v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965); Myer v. Lyford, 2 F.R.D. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1942)
Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
52. See supra note 31.
53. 555 F.2, 417, 425 (8th Cir. 1977).
54. Jurisdiction over the original claim resteli upon diversity and, as to the third-party
action the court had ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 424.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court went on to criticize the result which would be obtained by an application of the majority rule by saying that it "is not demanded hy Rule 14 and has its
origins In the midst of the precedents of earlier days and crystallized concepts that cannot
stand the light of searching modern examination." Id.
58. Id. at 425.
59. Since the action, had gone throigh two years of pleading and pretrial activity in
district court, no dis'ussinn on the issues of judicial economy or convenience was deemed
necessary. To surrender j",sdi' tion at this point woull, make it necessary for the plaintiff to reinstitute the action in state court, if possible. Ohviously this would be inconvenient and a waste of judicial resources. Id.
60. Id.
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lenged the jurisdiction of the court. It was not until the trial was almost over that Owen finally made this challenge. Thus the thirdparty defendant had connived for himself an unfair advantage. 6'
These actions alone justified the retention of jurisdiction and support2
ed a finding that the district court had not abused its discretion.
The Kroger decision is ample proof that the concepts of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction are still undergoing expansion.6 3 Whatever
the long range effects of the decision are, this case presents a desirable alternative to the harsh application of the majority rule. Under the Gibbs test, as applied by Kroger, assumption of jurisdiction
is not mandatory. Therefore its application need not present any problems to the district courts. Many of the cases which were decided
under the majority view would have the same result under the Gibbs
test. Those cases which justify a district court's retention of jurisdiction will not increase the overcrowding in the federal courts.
What the Kroger decision stands for is the assertion that fairness
and justice should prevail over form and worn out precedent.
TERRY WILES

61.

If

the trial went well the defendant could keep the jurisdictional defect hidden. If

it seemed to be going badly or he lost on the merits the defendant could challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 427.
62. The court went further than this and stated that even had the district court abused
its discretion in retaining jurisdiction Owen would have been estopped from asserting the
abuse in the light of its con uct. Id. For a discussion of the application of estoppel from
challenging jurisdiction see Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Di Frischia
v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). But see American Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951) : Mitchell v.
Maurer, 293 U.S. 2.7 (1934); Mansfield, C. &
L.M. R'y. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (184).
63. The dissent noted that the eighth circuit appears to be the first court of appels
to rule contrary to the majority view. 558 F.2d 417, 431 (Bright, J., dissenting).

FIRST NORTHWESTERN

TRUST Co.
Fargo/Bismarck/M inot
An Affiliat" qf Northwest Bancorporation

BANio

Our officers have many years of valuable trust experience in all phases of trust work, including
Estate Administration, Estate Planning, Farm
Management, Personal Trust Administration and
Administration of Employee Benefit Plans, and
are ready to serve you and your clients.
Fargo
Bismarck
Minot

'

First National Bank Bldg.
Dakota Northwestern Bank Bldg.
First National Bank Bldg.

293-1400
222-5181
852-4242

First
Trust Company
of

* Fargo
*Grand Forks
* Bismarck

North Dakota
P.0. Box 1980
P.O. Box 1118
P.O. Box 1778

293-3313
795-6100
223-1650

Whatever the needs of you and your client in the area of Trust
Services and Estate Planning, we're ready to handle them.
Stop in or call for competent and efficient assistance in
meeting your client's objectives.

